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COMPELLING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
IN VIOLATION OF FOREIGN LAW:
AN EXAMINATION AND REEVALUATION
OF THE AMERICAN POSITION
INTRODUCTION

Many nations have promulgated nondisclosure laws that prohibit
the production of documents requested for use in foreign legal proceedings.' The United States, however, maintains a liberal discovery
1. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl. Acts
1125, amended by 1976 Austl. Acts 1743; Uranium Information Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 76-644 (1976): Law Relating to the Communication of
Documents or Information to Foreign Authorities Regarding Maritime Commerce,
1968 Journal Officiel de la Rpublique Franiaise Recueil Dalloz [J.0.] 7267, 196S
Bulletin L~gislatiff Dalloz [B.L.D.] 438, amended by Law Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Documents or
Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons, 1980 J.0. 1799, 1980 B.L.D. 285
(English translation at 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 382 (1981)): Evidence Amendment Act,
[1980] 1 N.Z. Stat. 34; I Codigo de Comercio, tit. III, art. 89 (Pan. 1961); Protection
of Businesses Act, 1978, No. 99, as amended by Act of 1979, No. 114 (S. Afr.);
Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, § 30A, as amended by Atomic Energy Amendment
Act, 1978, No. 46 (S. Afr.); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, clh. 11 I(U.K.);
Law of May 24, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGB 2] 835 (W. Cer.); cf. Business
Records Protection Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 54, § 2(1) (1970); Business Concerns
Records Act, Que. Rev. Stat. ch. 278 (1964). Some nondisclosure laws provide that a
designated government official may prohibit the production of a certain category of
documents, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976
Austl. Acts 1125, amended by 1976 Austl. Acts 1743; Evidence Amendment Act,
[1980] 1 N.Z. Stat. 34; Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, cll. 11 (U.K.),
while others provide that no documents may be produced to foreign tribunals unless
such documents are normally sent out of the province in the ordinary course of
business. E.g,, Business Records Protection Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 54, § 1 (1970);
Business Concerns Records Act, Que. Rev. Stat. ch. 278, §§ 1-3 (1964). The recently
amended French Statute, Law Relating to the Communication of Documents or
Information to Foreign Authorities Regarding Maritime Commerce, 1968 J.0. 7267,
1968 B.L.D. 438, amended by Law Relating to the Communication of Economic,
Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons, 1980 J.0. 1799, 1980 B.L.D. 285 (English translation
at 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 382 (1981)), not only prohibits any disclosure of documents or
information that would "threaten the sovereignty, security, or essential economic
interests of France or public order, as defined by the government authorities to the
extent deemed necessary," id. art. 1, but also makes the very act of requesting any
documents or information of the nature specified without following French judicial
procedures an offense. Id. art. Ibis; B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and
International Antitrust: A Comparative Guide 75 (Supp. 1981). It provides: "Except
when international treaties or agreements or laws and regulations in force provide
otherwise, no person may request, seek to obtain or transmit, in writing, orally or in
any other form, documents or information of an economic, commercial, industrial,
financial or technical nature, intended for the constitution of evidence in connection
with pending or prospective foreign judicial or administrative proceedings." Id. The
primary purpose of the amendment was to ensure that foreign counsel comply with
the judicially supervised French discovery procedures. See Address by M. Guillaume,
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In accordance with that policy, United States courts have

consistently ordered parties to produce documents located abroad
even when production would subject the party to liability under a

foreign nondisclosure law.3 When such orders have not been obeyed,

Director of Legal Affairs of the French Ministry of External Affairs, Chambre de
Commerce Internationale, Paris (Apr. 1981) (on file with the Fordham Law Review): Advisory Opinion of the French Ministry of Justice, 1981 J.O. 373 question
35.893. Serving a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 request on a French party
requiring it to produce documents located in France is, therefore, an offense tinder
French law. Still other countries maintain more general business secrets legislation
that may prohibit the production of documents deemed to contain business secrets.
E.g., The Bank of Jamaica Law, 1961, ch. 6, § 34 (Cayman Islands 1963); Economic
Competition Act, 1956 Staatsblad voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 101,
art. 39, amended by Act of July 16, 1958, Stb. 413 (Neth.) (English translation at 5
OECD, Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices 1, 18-19 (June 1972)):
Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch, Code p6nal suisse, Codice penale svizzero [STGB,
C.P., Cod. P6n.] § 273 (Switz. 1971). Great Britain's Protection of Trading Interests
Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6, not only prevents the production of documents, but also has a
"clawback" provision that allows United Kingdom subjects, corporations or persons
carrying on business in the United Kingdom to sue the prevailing party in foreign
litigation to recover punitive damages awarded by foreign courts. Note, The Protection of Trading InterestsAct of 1980-Britain'sLatest Weapon in the Fight Against
United States Antitrust Laws, 4 Fordham Int'l L.J. 3,41, 374 (1981). Background
information on the French statute was supplied by Alexandre Carn6lutti, legal
counsel in the French Ministry of External Relations.
2. See United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 1977); C. Wright, Handbook of the
Law of Federal Courts § 81 (3d ed. 1976); Address by M. Handler, Antitrust: A
Worldwide Phenomenon-With an Emphasis on Extraterritoriality,Institute of International Business Law-Tokyo, at 19-21 (May 20, 1981) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the Fordham Law Review).
3. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1958); United States
v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329-33 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver,
546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana, [Current Developments] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,346,
at 92,146-49 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-49 (N.D. Ill. 1979); American Indus. Contracting,
Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880-81 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United
States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 23 F.R.D. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); In re
Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C. 1952); cf. United
States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407-09 (5th Cir.) (compelling testimony in violation of
foreign law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). But see Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297
F.2d 611, 612-13 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir.
1960); In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified sub
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United States
courts have imposed sanctions on the parties resisting
4
compliance.
Nondisclosure laws are often reactions to the extraterritorial application of United States laws. The Ontario Business Records Protection
Act 5 was enacted in response to grand jury subpoenas directed to
Canadian paper companies in 1947 regarding possible antitrust violations. 6 The Netherlands nondisclosure law 7 was prompted by the

1952 investigation of the world petroleum industry. 8 West Germany9

and Great Britain' 0 enacted nondisclosure laws in reaction to the 1960
grand jury investigation of multinational shipping conferences." The
recent litigation surrounding the activities of an international uranium cartel12 prompted Australia, 3 Canada'4 and South Africa's to

nom. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960): cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS,
271 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1959) (dictum) (production would not have been ordered
if it would have violated foreign law), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
4. E.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir.
1968); General Atomic C6. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 308-09 (S.D. Cal.
1981); Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 19-20 (D. Colo. 1977), affd sub nora.
Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
833 (1978).
5. Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 54 (1970).
6. Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 566-67 (Tokyo 1964)
(extract from debate in Ontario House of Commons); Note, Ordering Production of
Documents from Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 791, 805

n.55 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Ordering Production]. The subpoenas were issued
by the Southern District of New York and are discussed in In r'Grand Jur, Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
7. Economic Competition Act, 1956, Stb. 401, art. 39, amended by Act of July
16, 1958, Stb. 413 (Neth.) (English translation at 5 OECD, Guide to Legislation on
Restrictive Business Practices 1, 18-19 (June 1972)).
8. Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 572-73 (Tokyo 1964)
(extract of letter from Netherlands Ambassador to the United States); Note, Foreign
Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 Yale

L.J. 613, 613 n.5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Nondisclosure]; see Riedweg,
The Extra-TerritorialApplication of Restrictive Trade Legislation-Jurisdictionand

InternationalLaw, in Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 357, 40607 (Tokyo 1964). For a discussion of the investigation, see In re Investigation of
World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
9. Law of May 24, 1965, BGB2 835 (NW. Ger.).
10. Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87, repealed
and superseded by Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. (U.K.).
11. B. Hawk, supra note 1, at 319. The investigation is discussed in In re Grand
Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
12. Litigation commonly referred to as the "uranium cartel litigation" consists of
many cases involving breach of contract, for failure to deliver uranium, and antitrust
actions against uranium cartel members. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding jurisdiction over cartel activities): In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977)
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The circumstances attendant to

promulgation suggest that nondisclosure laws are part of a larger

conflict between the policies underlying the United States law sought
to be enforced and the policies sought to be promoted by the foreign
nondisclosure law.' 7 While the United States courts have fashioned

specific approaches to deal with nondisclosure laws, 8 these ap-

proaches fail to address the underlying conflict between United States
20
and foreign policies.' 9 Given the new wave of nondisclosure laws
and frequent foreign resistance to United States discovery abroad, 2 ' a
reevaluation of the present approaches is needed.

(vacating sanctions for failure to comply with discovery order); General Atomic Co.
v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (imposing sanctions for failure
to comply with discovery order); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480
F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (ordering production of documents in violation of
foreign law); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algorn Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (entering default judgments against cartel members); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. I11. 1979) (denying dismissal of
counterclaims by cartel members); In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Litig., 458 F.
Supp. 1223 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978) (consolidating four antitrust cases for pre-trial proceedings); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 405 F. Supp.
316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975) (consolidating 13 contract actions for pre-trial proceedings);
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1980) (entering
default judgment in state antitrust action), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451
U.S. 901 (1981).
13. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl. Acts
1125, amended by 1976 Austl. Acts 1743.
14. Uranium Information Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 76-644
(1976).
15. Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, § 30A, as amended by Atomic Energy
Amendment Act, 1978, No. 46 (S. Afr.).
16. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3, 1214 (Ont. 1977); B. Hawk, supra note 1, at 321.
17. See 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad §
15.01 (2d ed. 1981); 13. Hawk, supra note 1, at 319-20.
18. See infra pt. II.
19. See infra pt. III.
20. Seven nondisclosure laws have been promulgated since 1975. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl. Acts 1125, amended by
1976 Austl. Acts 1743; Uranium Information Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. &
Regs. 76-644 (1976); Law Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial ?r Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal Persons, 1980 J.O. 1799, 1980 B.L.D. 285 (France) (English translation
at 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 382 (1981)); Evidence Amendment Act, [1980] 1 N.Z. Stat. 34;
Protection of Businesses Act, 1978, No. 99, as amended by Act of 1979, No. 114 (S.
Mr.); Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, § 30A, as amended by Atomic Energy
Amendment Act, 1978, No. 46 (S. Afr.); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980,
ch. 11 (U.K.).
21. Resistance may take the form of denials of United States letters rogatory
requesting the production of documents. E.g., Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. &
Duquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3 (Ont. 1977); 'Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977). A letter rogatory is a
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This Note examines the well-established authority of United States
courts to order production even when production is prohibited by
foreign law.2 2 It also assesses the conflicting approaches employed by
United States courts and rejects both the ability of treaties to alleviate
the problem and an approach suggested by a recent commentator.
This Note contends that the propriety of a production order should
turn on an evaluation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
interests underlying the United States law sought to be enforced and
those underlying the nondisclosure law. It also argues that full consideration of these interests should be made prior to the entry of a
production order. It is concluded that United States courts should
exercise greater restraint and demonstrate greater respect for foreign
interests when ordering production that would violate foreign law or
imposing sanctions for noncompliance with a production order. Incorporating these contentions, this Note proposes a new approach for
resolving disputes involving nondisclosure laws.
I. INTERNATIONAL

JURISDICTION AND

DisCovERY POLICIES

A. InternationalJurisdictionof Nations
A nation must have the requisite international jurisdiction to apply
its laws extraterritorially. 23 There are two types of international
jurisdiction: prescriptive and enforcement..2 4 Prescriptive jurisdiction
refers to the authority of a State "to enact laws governing the conduct,
relations, status or interests of persons, or to things," whether by

request from a court in one country to the court of another country to perform some
judicial act. Stern, International Judicial Assistance Part I: Service and Discovery
Abroad, Prac. Law., Dec. 1968, at 22. Foreign countries have also filed diplomatic
protests over United States discovery requests with the State Department, several of
which are reproduced in Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 565-92
(Tokyo 1964). In the recent uranium cartel litigation, several protests were filed with
the State Department. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp.
1138, 1149 (N.D. II. 1979).
22. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1958): United
States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d
338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Vestinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 114648 (N.D. I11. 1979).
23. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 131522 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549
F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1144 (N.D. IMl. 1979); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 6 (1965); B. Hawk, supra note 1, at 19. For a detailed discussion of
international jurisdiction with respect to document production, see Onkelinx, Conflict of InternationalJurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. 487, 489-501 (1969).
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A State has

plenary power to prescribe within its territory,20 and limited power to
prescribe outside of its territory.2 7 With respect to the discovery of
documents, in the United States the prescriptive rule is that a party
must produce non-privileged documents in its custody or control. 28
This rule applies when the documents are sought from a party under
rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 from a nonparty
witness pursuant to a subpoena served under rule 45,30 or from a
witness in a grand jury3' or administrative investigation. 32 When a
party fails to produce the requested documents, the court may enter
an order compelling production pursuant to rule 37(a) .33 Similarly, if
25. Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 401 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981); accord FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-aMousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio
Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 6 & comment a (1965).
26. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 74, 86, 7 Cranch 116, 136,
(1812) (Marshall, C.J.); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 17 (1965); Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of tile
United States § 402(1)(a) & (b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
27. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18
(1965); Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§
402(1)(c), 403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). The foremost exception to the territorial
limitation is the effects doctrine, which grants a nation jurisdiction over acts that
have or are intended to have a substantial effect within the nation's territory. See
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 608-16 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1945); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18
(1965); Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
28. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir.
1968); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l
Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Although these cases do not
address the question of privilege, it is clear that privilege is a limitation on the rule.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Rule 34(a) provides in part that "[a]ny party may serve on
any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or
someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents ...
which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in
the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served." Id.
30. Id. 45(b). The rule provides that "[a] subpoena may also command the
person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible
things designated therein." Id.
31. See id. 81(a)(3). The rule provides that "[t]hese rules apply to proceedings to
compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with a
subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the
United States except as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district court
or by order of the court in the proceedings." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. 37(a). The rule provides that "[a] party, upon reasonable notice to other
parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery
...if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, falls
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a person fails to comply with a subpoena, the court may order compli34
ance.
When a court enters such orders, it exercises enforcement jurisdiction.3 5 Enforcement jurisdiction refers to the authority of a State to
compel compliance, or impose sanctions for noncompliance, with its
prescriptive rules.3 6 If a party fails to comply with a production
order, the court may invoke rule 37(b), which provides a panoply of

sanctions for failure to cooperate in discovery.

7

If a person fails to

comply with a subpoena, the court may hold him in contempt. s
Unlike prescriptive jurisdiction, enforcement jurisdiction is limited to

to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection
as requested, the discovering party may move for an order. . . compelling inspection
in accordance with the request." Id. The party resisting production because of a
nondisclosure law may move for a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c),
which provides that '[u]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or a person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense." Id.
34. See United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981): United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y.
1947).
35. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1144 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Onkelinx, supra note 24, at 495. An exercise of enforcement
jurisdiction without a prior showing of prescriptive jurisdiction is contrary to international law and gives rise to a claim by the State adversely affected. FTC v.
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316-17 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 8 &
comments d-e (1965); Onkelinx, supra note 24, at 499. This is of particular importance when the documents are sought to prove jurisdiction under the effects doctrine.
When the court enforces such a discovery order it is exercising enforcement jurisdiction before prescriptive jurisdiction is shown to exist. FTC v. Compagnie de SaintGobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Onkelinx, s-upra
note 24, at 498-99.
36. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 6
& comment a (1965); Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 401(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). The rule provides that -[i]f a party... fails to obey
an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision
(a) of this rule ... the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: (A) An order that
the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall
be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim
of the party obtaining the order; (B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party
to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters into evidence; (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against
the disobedient party." Id.
38. Id. 45(f).
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a nation's territory.3 9 A court cannot extend "its process
into another
40
state to make effective or to enforce its decree there.

That one nation has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law does not
preclude another State from prescribing a contrary rule. 41 The existence of a nondisclosure law, therefore, does not prevent a United
States court from ordering the production of documents subject to that
nondisclosure law or from imposing sanctions for noncompliance with
such an order.42 When a court's enforcement actions would subject
the person resisting production to liability in a foreign nation, however, the Second Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States urges the court to moderate its enforcement actions. 43
This principle of moderation has been extended in the recent tentative draft of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. 44 The draft
provides that exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction be reasonable; 45 it

also provides that an otherwise reasonable exercise of jurisdiction may
40
be unreasonable if it would cause a person to violate foreign law.
The tentative draft apears to treat the issuance of a production order
as an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction 47 and therefore subject to the
requirement of reasonableness. Regardless of whether a production
order is termed an exercise of enforcement or prescriptive jurisdiction,
it is clear that the drafters intended that principles of moderation and
restraint guide the court's determination of whether production
should be compelled.

39. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 20 & illustrations 1-3 (1965); Onkelinx, supra note 24, at 496.
40. G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 100 (3d ed. 1963) (footnote
omitted); see Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, [1964-1]
Recueil des Cours 1, .128, 138 (1964).
41. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
39(1) (1965).
42. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
43. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 39(2), 40 (1965); c'. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (balancing of interests approach applied to extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. &
S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (same).
44. Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
45. Id.; accord Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549
F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976).
46. Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
47. See id. § 415 comment f (judicial decree exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction);
id. introductory note, at 91-92 (nondisclosure disputes covered in discussion of prescriptive jurisdiction).
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B. Discovery Practices:Foreign and Domestic

Traditionally, the conflict surrounding nondisclosure laws has been
viewed as one between the policies underlying the United States discovery rules and the principle of international comity. 48 In the
United States, a court may order the production of documents that are
in the custody or control of a party subject to the court's jurisdiction 49
regardless of the location of the documents.50 It is not ground for

objection that the documents will be inadmissible at trial as long as
the documents sought "[appear] reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence." '5

The conflict of laws principle of

2
lexfori holds that the law of the forum governs procedural matters.A

The production of documents is a procedural matter.

3

The principle

of lex fori thus permits United States courts to compel production of

documents despite the existence of nondisclosure laws.54

Under the traditional approach, the only factor militating against

discovery is the principle of international comity.55 Comity provides
48. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992,
997 (10th Cir. 1977); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); B. Hawk, supra note 1, at 318-19:
ForeignNondisclosure, supra note 8, at 614; Note, Discovery of Documents Located
Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning
the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 747, 748 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]; Ordering Production, supra note 6, at
796.
49. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. A parent corporation has control
over the documents of its subsidiary, foreign or domestic, if the parent "has power,
either directly or indirectly, through another corporation or series of corporations, to
elect a majority of the directors of" the subsidiary. In re Investigation of World
Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1952) (emphasis omitted).
50. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1144 (N.D. I11.
1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper
Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
52. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953),
modified sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956); see Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver,
546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Restatement
of Conflict of Laws § 585 (1934); J. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1600
(1935).
53. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C.
1952).
54. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976)
("Foreign law may not control local law. It cannot invalidate an order which local
law authorizes."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Societe Internationale v.
McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953) ("Procedures of the law of the
forum customarily govern law suits ....
It seems obvious that foreign law cannot be
permitted to obstruct the investigation and discovery of facts in a case."), modified
sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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that one nation must respect the laws of other nations so that its laws
will be accorded reciprocal respect.5 6 To that end, one nation ought
not compel acts that violate the laws of another State. 57 The lexfori/
comity analysis Fails to focus on the underlying substantive conflict
between United States and foreign policies generated by the extraterritorial application of United States laws.
The nondisclosure law problem is exacerbated by the difference
between United States and foreign discovery practices. American discovery rules are far more liberal than their foreign counterparts.5
Contrary to American discovery practices, which have been condemned abroad as "fishing expeditions," 59 most common-law and
civil-law countries allow only the discovery of evidence that would be
admissible at trial. 60 Because discovery in civil-law jurisdictions is
normally conducted by the judiciary, 61 "American counsel conducting
an unsupervised deposition or the inspection of documents in American fashion in a Civil-Law country may be improperly performing a
public judicial act which is seen as infringing the foreign State's
judicial sovereignty."'6 2 The proper method of obtaining evidence

from abroad is a letter rogatory 63-a formal request by the court of
one country to the court of another asking that the foreign court lend
its aid in securing some act in the foreign country. 4 In addition,
some nations consider American production orders an infringement on
their sovereignty. 6 5 By compelling a party to produce documents
situated abroad, the court attempts to accomplish indirectly that
which it could not do directly6 6 because it cannot extend its process

abroad. 67
56. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258,
139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923); J. Story, Conflict of Laws § 35 (1872).
57. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960); Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 53 comment d (1969); Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 94
(1934); see J. Story, supra note 56, § 35.
58. See 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17, § 15.10; Carter, Existing
Rules and Procedures, 13 Int'l Law. 5, 5-6 (1979).
59. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434,
442 (H.L. 1977); RCA v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 All E.R. 549, 554 (Q.B.).
60. See sources cited supra note 58.
61. 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17, § 15.10.
62. Carter, supra note 58, at 7.
63. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1960); Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b);
Stern, supra note 21, at 22.
64. Stern, supra note 21, at 22; see Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir.
1960); Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b)(3).
65. 2J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17, § 15.10; Riedweg, supra note 8, at
403.
66. Riedweg, supra note 8, at 403; see 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17,
§ 15.10.
67. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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II.

EXISTING STANDARDS FOR ORDERING PRODUCTION
IN VIOLATION OF FOREIGN LAW

United States courts have employed three approaches when faced
with nondisclosure laws. Under the "good faith" approach, nondisclosure laws do not bar a court from ordering production of documents
located abroad, 6 and the nondisclosure law and the efforts to comply
with the production order are relevant only to the determination of
sanctions.6 9 In contrast, the "balancing of national interests" approach requires the court to consider United States and foreign interests when ordering production, 70 and to moderate its actions in light of
those interests.7 ' In the early 1960's, the Second Circuit adopted the
"international comity approach," which provided that production
would not be ordered if it would violate foreign law. 7- The circuit
later abandoned this approach in favor of the balancing of national
interests approach. 73 Regardless of the approach utilized, a court will
impose sanctions for noncompliance with a production order if the
party resisting production has acted willfully or in bad faith,74 or has

68. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1958); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 952-53 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,
480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-48 (N.D. Ill. 1979); see American Indus. Contracting, Inc.
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
69. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958); Arthur Andersen
& Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1096 (1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1149
(N.D. II. 1979).
70. United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981). cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981): United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,
[Current Developments] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,14648 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 16, 1981); cf. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir.) (compelling
oral testimony), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 40(a) (1965).
71. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§
39-40 (1965).
72. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271
F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
73. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC
v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, [Current Developments] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,346, at 92,146 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981).
74. United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981): United States %. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1968): Ohio v. Crofters, Inc.. 75 F.R.D. 12, 15 (D.
Colo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th
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"deliberately
courted legal impediments to production" of the docu75
ments.

The Second, 711 Fifth7 7 and Ninth 78 Circuits embrace the balancing

approach for determining the propriety of production orders and
sanctions. The Tenth Circuit follows the good faith approach with
respect to production orders, 79 but follows the balancing of national
interests approach when imposing sanctions.80 The D.C. Circuit
appears to follow the Tenth Circuit. 8' The Northern District of
Illinois,8 2 the Southern District of California, 83 the Western District of

Pennsylvania 84 and the Supreme Court of New Mexico 8" have all
embraced the good faith approach.

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic
Co., 629 P.2d 231,329 (N.M. 1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901
(1981).
75. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958). A party deliberately courts legal impediments to the production of documents if it places them
abroad to make them unavailable in anticipation of litigation, id. at 208.09; General
Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 307 (S.D. Cal. 1981); United
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 308-09 (N.M. 1980), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981), acts to evade United States laws
with intent to use the nondisclosure law as a shield, Societe Internationale v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, [Current Developments] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,148 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981), or
induces the foreign government to enact or to enforce a nondisclosure law. See
Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 201, 208 (1958).
76. Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972):
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968); see SEC v.
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, [Current Developments] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,346, at 92,146-47 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981).
77. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
940 (1976).
78. United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981).
79. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th'Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
80. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997
(10th Cir. 1977).
81. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1326
n.148 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. ir. 1979).
82. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-49
(N.D. Ill. 1979).
83. General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 295-96 (S.D. Cal.
1981).
84. American Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp.
879, 880-81 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
85. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 268-69 (N.M.
1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981).
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A. The Good Faith Approach: Societe Internationale v. Rogers
The good faith approach was first articulated by the Supreme
Court in 1958 in Societe Internationalev. Rogers.86 In Societe, the
plaintiff Swiss holding company sought to recover assets seized by the

United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act8 7 during World

War 11.88 To determine whether the plaintiff was an enemy within
the meaning of the Act, the government requested that the plaintiff
produce its Swiss banking records. 89 The Swiss Federal Attorney
determined that production of the documents would violate Swiss
law 90 and placed an interdiction on their release. 9 ' The plaintiff
moved to be excused from production because production would sub-

ject it to liability under Swiss law 92 and contended that Swiss law
deprived it of control over the documents. 3 After the district court
denied the motion,9 4 the plaintiff obtained waivers for a substantial
number of the requested documents.9 5 Because full compliance was

impossible,96 however, the district court dismissed the action.
affirmance,"8

7

On

review of the court of appeals'
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that due process bars dismissal when the plaintiff's
failure to comply with a production order is not willful, in bad faith

or fostered by its own conduct,9 9 and remanded the case to the district

86. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). For a detailed discussion of the facts of Societe and its
complicated procedural history, see Note, Limitations on the FederalJudicialPower
to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1441, 1458 n.159 (1963).
87. 40 Stat. 419 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 9(a) (1976)).
88. 357 U.S. at 199.
89. Id. at 199-200.
90. Id. at 200.
91. Id. at 200-01.
92. Id. at 200.
93. Id.
94. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 448 (D.D.C. 1953),
modified sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
95. 357 U.S. at 202-03.
96. Id. at 202.
97. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 438 (D.D.C. 1953)
(dismissal conditioned on failure to comply with production order within three
months), modified sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1955) (grace period extended to six months), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
Upon the expiration of the six-month period, the district court dismissed the action
and the circuit court affirmed. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 243 F.2d 254
(D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197
(1958).
98. Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 243 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1957), revid sub
nom. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
99. 357 U.S. at 209-12.
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court for consideration of alternative sanctions. 00 In so holding,
however, the Supreme Court acknowledged the propriety of the production order.101
Three factors were relevant to the Court's determination that the
nondisclosure law did not preclude the issuance of the production
order. 02 First, the Court emphasized the importance of the congressional policies underlying the law upon which the action was
brought. 0 3 The Court stated that to hold that "fear of punishment
under the laws of its sovereign precludes a court from finding that
petitioner had 'control' over [the documents] . . . and thereby from
ordering their production, would undermine congressional policies." 104 Second, the Court determined that the documents were vital
to the effectuation of those policies. 05 Third, the Court was influenced by the plaintiff's ability to secure waivers from the Swiss government for many of the documents. 06 The Court stated that district
courts should be free to require those who face legal impediments to
the production of documents to make
efforts "to the maximum of their
10 7
ability" to comply with the order.

The Supreme Court did not examine the foreign interests behind
the nondisclosure law, nor did it balance them against the United
States interests. Under Societe, therefore, the determination of
whether to order production rests solely upon a consideration of the
United States interests and not on those of the foreign sovereign.
Further, the Court determined that nondisclosure laws and efforts to
achieve compliance with the order were relevant only to the determination of sanctions for noncompliance with the order, stating that
"[w]hatever its reasons, petitioner did not comply with the production
order. Such reasons, and the willfulness or good faith of petitioner,

100. Id. at 212-13.

101. Id. at 204-06.
102. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-48
(N.D. Il. 1979); see Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1958).
103. 357 U.S. at 204-06. The Court stated that the "possibility of enemy taint of
nationals of neutral powers, particularly of holding companies with intricate financial structures ... was of deep concern to the Congress." Id. at 204-05.
104. Id. at 205.
105. Id. It has been suggested that the requirement that the documents be vital to
the litigation replaces the normal rule 26(b) standard that they be reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,
480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1979); see Recent Developments, supra note 48, at
751.
106. 357 U.S. at 205. The Court noted that "[p]etitioner is in a most advantageous
position to plead with its own sovereign for a relaxation of penal laws or for adoption
of plans which will at the least achieve a significant measure of compliance with the
production order, and indeed to that end it has already made significant progress."
Id.
107. Id.
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can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to
the path which the District Court might follow in dealing with peti-

tioner's failure to comply." 108

In reversing the dismissal, the Court relied heavily on the good faith
demonstrated by the plaintiff in seeking waivers of the Swiss law. 0 9
Although the Court determined that good faith efforts do not excuse

noncompliance,110 it held that they did prevent the imposition of the
harshest rule 37(b) sanctions.'

The Court adopted a two-pronged

approach to determining good faith. First, the part), resisting production must have made efforts "to the maximum of [its] ability" to

achieve compliance,1 2 and second, it must not have "deliberately
3
courted legal impediments" to the production of documents."1

4
The Supreme Court limited its holding to the facts of Societe."1

This limitation may be responsible for the conflicting positions taken

by United States courts after Societe." 5 While a few courts cite the
decision as support for a balancing approach,'" others interpret it as
inconsistent with a balancing approach."17 Most courts, however, do
not address this issue, but instead cite Societe as support for narrower

propositions." 8
approach."

9

Societe does not call for a balancing of interests

Two commentators contend that nothing in Societe

precludes district court judges from balancing competing interests in
their role as overseers of the discovery process.' 2 0

The Supreme

108. Id. at 208.
109. Id. at 211.
110. Id. at 208.
111. Id. at 212-13.
112. Id. at 205, 211-12.
113. Id. at 208-09; see supra note 75.
114. 357 U.S. at 205-06.
115. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
116. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997
(10th Cir. 1977); Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir.
1972).
117. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-48
(N.D. I1. 1979); see Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
118. E.g., United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Societe only prevents dismissal where party, makes extensive efforts at compliance),
cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Societe
requires good faith efforts to comply with subpoena); Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976) (Societe implies that nondisclosure
laws are relevant only to sanctions), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Montship
Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Societe
requires good faith effort to seek waiver of nondisclosure law); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (Societe requires good faith effort
to achieve compliance with production order).
119. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
120. See 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17, § 15.17.
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Court's failure to examine the foreign interests, however, suggests that

the relevant inquiries are to the strength of the American interests and

the need for production to effectuate those interests.' 2' It further

suggests that nondisclosure laws and the efforts to achieve
compliance
22
are relevant only to the determination of sanctions.

B. The Balancing of NationalInterests Approach:
The Second Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States
Since its introduction in 1965, the balancing of national interests

approach of the Second Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of

the United States 2 3 has often been employed by United States courts

faced with nondisclosure laws.

24

The Restatement provides that one

nation's having jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce a rule of law does
not preclude another nation also having jurisdiction from prescribing
or enforcing a contrary rule. 25 The Restatement urges, however,
that a State moderate its enforcement actions in light of five factors
when its law requires a person to engage in conduct that is contrary to

the law of another nation:
(a) [the] vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can
reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.'
Unlike the good faith approach, the balancing of national interests

approach, therefore, calls for an inquiry into the foreign interests as
well as those of the United States.

27

Further, because entering an

121. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
123. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§
39-40 (1965). Section 39 of the Restatement provides: "(1) A state having jurisdiction
to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction
solely because such exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to
liability under the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that
conduct. (2) Factors to be considered in minimizing conflicts arising from the application of the rule stated in Subsection (1) with respect to enforcement jurisdiction are
stated in § 40." Id. § 39. Section 40 specifies limitations on enforcement jurisdiction.
Id. § 40; see infra text accompanying note 126.
124. See supra notes 76-78, 80-81 and accompanying text.
125. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 39
(1965).
126. Id. §§ 40(a)-(e).
127. See sources cited supra note 70.
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order compelling production or enforcing a subpoena is treated as an
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction,12 8 a court employing the balancing approach should consider these five factors at the order stage as
well as at the sanction stage. 29
In United States v. FirstNational City Bank,130 in 1968, the Second
Circuit applied the balancing approach and explored the foreign and
domestic interests. Citibank was subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce documents relating to alleged antitrust violations by its cus-

tomers.13 1 Citibank produced the documents located in its New York

office, 32 but for fear of liability under German law,13 3 refused to
produce the documents located in its German branch.134 The district
court enforced the subpoena and held Citibank in contempt. 35

In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit considered several of the Restatement factors. The court discussed the na-

tionality of Citibank and its customers who were under investiga-

tion 1 36 and emphasized the unlikelihood of hardship to Citibank
under German law.1 37 The court's principal focus, however, was on
the national interests of the United States and Germany.138 With
respect to the United States interests, the Second Circuit stated that
the antitrust laws "have long been considered cornerstones of this

128. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); United States v.Field, 532 F.2d
404, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v.Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,
[Current Developments] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
Nov. 16, 1981).
130. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).

98,346, at 92,146-48 (S.D.N.Y.

131. Id. at 898.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 898-99. Production of the documents would expose Citibank to civil
suit in Germany by the customers whose records were produced. Id. The government
argued that foreign liability had to be criminal to prevent enforcement of the
subpoena, but the court rejected this argument, stating that -[w]e would be reluctant
to hold.., that the mere absence of criminal sanctions abroad necessarily mandates
obedience to a subpoena .... The vital national interests of a foreign nation...

can be expressed in ways other than through the criminal law." Id. at 901-02.
134. Id. at 898-99.
135. In re First Nat'l City Bank, 285 F. Supp. 845, 848-49 (S.D.N.Y.), affd sub
nom. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). The district

court held the bank in contempt because it had not made good faith efforts to comply
with the subpoena. Id.
136. 396 F.2d at 904-05. The court found that the likelihood of Citibank incurring
damages was speculative because of its defenses under German law and the latitude
accorded German courts in awarding damages. Id.
137. Id. at 905. The court noted that Citibank was an American corporation, and
that one of its customers who threatened to sue Citibank in Cermany was a New
York corporation. Id.
138. Id. at 902-04.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

nation's economic policies, have been vigorously enforced and the
subject of frequent interpretation by our Supreme Court."'13 Turning to the German interest in bank secrecy, the court found that the
German law provided only a privilege that could be waived by the
customer and that the law's enforcement was left to the "vagaries of
private litigation." 140 The court also noted the conspicuous absence
of banks from other German secrecy legislation.' 4 '

Additionally, the

court was influenced by the absence of German government or United
States Department of State indications that the investigation would
affect the relations between the two countries.1 42 The court found
that the German interest in secrecy was less substantial than the
American interest in enforcing its antitrust laws 4 3 and, therefore,
affirmed the production order. "44
The Second Circuit, however, had not always so thoroughly considered the United States and foreign interests. Prior to its adoption of
the balancing approach in First National City Bank, the Second Circuit had followed an approach that emphasized international comity.
C. The InternationalComity Approach
In three cases decided by the Second Circuit between 1959 and
1962, it was determined that production should not be ordered if it
would violate foreign law.' 45 The primary focus was on international
147
comity' 46 and the use of diplomatic channels to obtain evidence.

This emphasis may be attributable to the circumstance that in all48
three cases, the documents were sought from nonparty witnesses.1

139. Id. at 903.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 903-04.
142. Id. at 904.
143. See id. at 903-04.
144. Id. at 905.

145. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271
F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960). Only in Ings was the
subpoena actually modified so as not to violate Canadian law. 282 F.2d at 152-53. In
Chase Manhattan, the subpoena was left in effect to ensure that the bank would
cooperate with United States officials in obtaining the documents. 297 F.2d at 613.
In First National City Bank, the court remanded the case to determine whether
production would violate Panamanian law. 271 F.2d at 620.
146. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271
F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
147. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960).
148. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 150 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d
616, 617-18 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
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The court in Ings v. Ferguson149 stated that "it seems highly undesirable that the courts of the United States should countenance service of
a subpoena upon [a corporation] which is not a part), to the litigation" 50 and whose country will entertain letters rogatory seeking the

production of documents.151 The court determined that letters rogatory should be used to obtain the evidence in order that the Canadian
courts be afforded the opportunity to determine whether the production would violate Canadian law. 52
The international comity approach, in stark contrast to the good
faith approach, suffers from an overemphasis on comity in that it
automatically defers to foreign law without consideration of the underlying United States or foreign interests.153 For example, in In re
Chase Manhattan Bank,' 4 the bank was served with a grand jury
subpoena to produce documents located in its Panamanian
branch.' 5 5 The Panamanian nondisclosure law" 1 provided only a

minimal fine for its violation,'5 indicating that the Panamanian interest in secrecy was not of vital national importance. Nevertheless, the

court held that it would not compel the bank to violate Panamanian
law.15 8 Such deference to foreign law may only encourage the use of

foreign laws to evade domestic discovery. The Second Circuit abandoned this approach in 1968 in favor of the more flexible balancing of
interests approach. 59

III. THE FAILURE OF THE EXISTING APPROACHES
TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE MEANS FOR CONFRONTING

THE NONDISCLOSURE LAW DILEMMA
The existing approaches have not solved the nondisclosure law
dilemma. On four occasions, nondisclosure laws have been enacted in
reaction to the extraterritorial application of United States laws.'Go
149. 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
150. Id. at 152. The posture of the resisting party with respect to the litigation is a
proper, indeed important, factor. See infra text accompanying note 253.
151. 282 F.2d at 151-52.
152. Id. at 152-53.
153. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271
F.2d 616, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied. 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
154. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
155. Id. at 611.
156. I Codigo de Comercio, tit. III, art. 89 (Pan. 1961).
157. Id., discussed in 297 F.2d at 612 (2d Cir. 1962) (violation of the statute was
the equivalent of a misdemeanor, with a maximum fine of 100 balboas).
158. 297 F.2d at 613.
159. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, [Current Developments] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) J 98,346, at 92,147 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981) (citing United States v.
First Nat'1 City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968)).
160. See supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, three nondisclosure laws have recently been enacted, not in
response to pending litigation, but in anticipation of future litigation. 1" The continued promulgation of nondisclosure laws reflects
the failure of the existing approaches to provide a means to resolve the
problem.
The good faith approach fails to require a full consideration of the
foreign interests, 62 and what consideration they are given is delayed
until the sanctions hearing, 163 a point at which the potential for
avoiding international conflict is minimal.' °4 The emphasis is on
discovery to effectuate United States policies rather than on attempting to65 accommodate the conflicting United States and foreign interests. 1

The most recent application of the good faith approach was in the
litigation surrounding the activities of the international uranium car"'
tel. 66
In response to the litigation, the Canadian government
promulgated the Uranium Information Security Regulations, which
prohibited the disclosure of cartel-related information. 10 7 Canada
contended that the United States uranium policies, in contravention of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 66 had caused a depression in the market for non-United States uranium, adversely affecting
the Canadian uranium industry. 6 9 To alleviate the problem, Can-

161. Law Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial,
Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons, 1980 J.O. 1799, 1980 B.L.D. 285 (France) (English translation at 75 Am. J.
Int'l L. 382 (1981)); Evidence Amendment Act, [1980] 1 N.Z. Stat. 34; Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (U.K.).
162. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1958); Arthur
Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp.
1138, 1146-49 (N.D. Ill. 1979); American Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880-81 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United Nuclear Corp. v. General
Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 268-69 (N.M. 1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
451 U.S. 901 (1981); supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
163. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958); Arthur Andersen
& Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096
(1977); Westinghouse Elee. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-49
(N.D. Ill. 1979); see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
164. Foreign Nondisclosure, supra note 8, at 617; see 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster,
supra note 17, § 15.06.
165. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146.
49 (N.D. Ill. 1979); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 26466 (N.M. 1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); supra notes
103-07 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 12.
167. Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 76-644 (1976).
168. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
169. Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3, 11-13
(Ont. 1977); InternationalUianium Supply and Demand: Hearing Before the Sub-
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ada initiated discussions with other producer nations which ultimately
led to an informal marketing arrangement. 70
Westinghouse instituted an antitrust action against the alleged cartel members, some of which were Canadian corporations.'"
Westinghouse requested that the Canadian defendants produce their cartel-related documents.17 2 When the defendants failed to produce the
requested documents, Westinghouse moved for an order compelling
production. 73 In the related breach of contract actions brought
against Westinghouse by several public utilities,174 the Ontario High
Court refused to enforce United States letters rogatory., 75 The Ontario Court determined that it would be inappropriate to release
documents that would also be used in the antitrust action to determine

whether actions taken by or on behalf of the Canadian
government
76
were contrary to the laws of the United States. 1

In three major discovery-related decisions in the cartel litigation,

77

the good faith approach was employed. 178 In the initial antitrust

action, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,' 79 the District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois found the Restatement
balancing approach to be "inherently unworkable" 80 and held that
the numerous foreign protests were relevant only to determining the

likelihood that the foreign law would be waived.' 8 ' The court orcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-15 (1976) (background paper on the Canadian
uranium industry's activities in international uranium marketing, prepared by the
Canadian Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources).
170. See sources cited supra note 169.
171. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
172. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (N.D.
Ill.
1979).
173. Id. at 1142-43.
174. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992
(10th Cir. 1977).
175. Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3, 21-22
(Ont. 1977).
176. Id.; accord Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., II1D.L.R.3d 74, 86 (Can.
1980).
177. General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Il. 1979);
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1980), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981).

178. General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 295-96 (S.D. Cal.
1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1146-48
(N.D. Ill.
1979); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 268-69
(N.M. 1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). But see In re

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997-99 (10th
Cir. 1977) (balancing approach employed in evaluating sanctions, but good faith
approach left intact for assessing production orders).
179. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
180. Id. at 1148.
181. Id. at 1149.

898
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dered production 182 and reserved any further consideration of foreign
interests until the sanction stage of the proceedings,"8 3 arguing that
then "the potential moderation of the exercise of their conflicting
enforcement jurisdictions can be meaningfully considered."' 8 4 Although the case was settled, 18 5 given the court's conclusion that a
balancing approach was inherently unworkable,' 86 it is doubtful that
the foreign interests would have been meaningfully addressed.
In United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co. 87 and General
Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co. ,1s8 subsequent antitrust actions, the
balancing approach was also not employed. In United Nuclear, the
New Mexico Supreme Court employed the good faith approach to
affirm both a production order and a default judgment. 89 The court
held that the nondisclosure law was not revelant to the production
order, 9 0 and citing General Atomic's bad faith in resisting production, affirmed the default judgment.19' In Exxon Nuclear, the Southern District of California found that Gulf Oil had made good faith
efforts to produce the requested documents.102 Nevertheless, because
Gulf had previously courted legal impediments to the production of
the documents, 93 the court precluded Gulf from introducing evidence
in support of certain 94defenses and designated that certain facts be
taken as established. 1
Because good faith is determined on a case-by-case basis,9 5 the
party resisting discovery cannot be certain what efforts will be considered good faith efforts. Some courts appear to equate partial compliance with a finding of good faith, 19 6 while others have found good
faith despite noncompliance where efforts had been made to obtain

182. Id. at 1156.
183. Id. at 1149, 1156.
184. Id. at 1156.
185. See N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, § 4, at 4, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1981,
§ 4, at 5, cols. 5-6; N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, § 3, at 22, cols. 5-6.
186. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
187. 629 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901
(1981).
188. 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
189. 629 P.2d at 268-69.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 329.
192. 90 F.R.D. at 294-95.
193. Id. at 296-99.
194. Id. at 308. Although these sanctions were warranted in this case, they should
generally be avoided. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
195. Foreign Nondisclosure, supra note 8, at 618-19; see Societe Internationale v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1958).
196. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 202-03, 211 (1958); Calcutta
E. Coast of India & E. Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
399 F.2d 994, 997 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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waivers of the foreign law.19 7 Further, delaying consideration of the
foreign interests to the sanction stage is inefficient. It is no easier to
assess the foreign interests at the sanction stage, which is dominated
by consideration of the efforts made to comply with the order.',,
Finally, by neither emphasizing the use of letters rogatory nor exploring alternate means of compliance, the good faith approach shows
inadequate respect for international comity.
The uranium cartel litigation reveals these shortcomings. By encouraging the formation and activities of the international uranium
cartel, 99 the Canadian government had become a principal in the
underlying controversy. The passage of the Uranium Information
Security Regulations2 00 and the denial of letters rogator 20' indicated
that the Canadian government considered the litigation an infringement on its sovereignty. It was, therefore, exceedingly clear that the
production orders placed the resisting parties in a no-win position and
exacerbated an already significant international conflict. Under the
circumstances, application of the abandoned international comity approach would surely have precluded the issuance of the production
orders. It is not clear, however, whether the conflict would have been
alleviated by the use of the balancing of national interests approach.
The balancing approach is superior to the good faith and international comity approaches as a means to confront the nondisclosure law
problem. It calls for some consideration of the foreign interests at the
order stage and for moderation of enforcement actions in light of those
interests. 20 2 Despite providing a better means by which nondisclosure
law problems may be resolved, the balancing approach, too, has its
shortcomings.
The Restatement does not recognize that the propriety of production orders should turn upon a weighing of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the underlying interests sought to be enforced. Section
40 of the Restatement lists the "vital national interests of each of the
states" as one of five factors to be considered ,%,hen compelling con197. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 , 998
(10th Cir. 1977); General Atomic Co. v. E.xxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 294
(S.D. Cal. 1981).
198. See, e.g., Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 202-03, 211-12
(1958); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992,
995-96 (10th Cir. 1977); Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12. 19-20 (D. Colo. 1970),
aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1372-74 (10th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978), United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic
Co., 629 P.2d 231, 280-302 (N.M. 1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S.
901 (1981). But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1156 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
199. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
200. Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 76-644 (1976).
201. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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duct contrary to foreign law.20 3 A careful reading of the Restatement

and its comments and illustrations reveals that the drafters were more
concerned with the plight of individuals subject to conflicting demands than with the impact of exercises of jurisdiction on the underlying policies of foreign states. 20 4 Furthermore, the Restatement defines the term "vital national interests" narrowly 20 s and emphasizes
that a vital national interest is "a factor favoring the exercise of
jurisdiction, even though it interferes with such exercises by another
state. ' 206 Because the Restatement, upon a finding of such an interest
of the forum State, fails to require accommodation of the other nation's interests, the United States interests have consistently pre-

vailed.2 07

If the Restatement approach had been employed in the

203. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
40(a) (1965).
204. Section 40 of the Second Restatement addresses the problem of requiring
"inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person," rather than the impact of the
required conduct on the interests of the foreign state. Id. § 40. Section 40(b) requires
courts to make an inquiry into "the extent and the nature of the hardship that
inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person." Id. § 40(b). Comment c to § 40 further indicates that this factor is to be accorded "special weight." Id.
comment c. Illustration 5, which deals with compelling conduct that is a criminal
offense in a foreign state, specifies that the hardship on the individual must be
considered, but makes no mention of the policies underlying the criminal law. Id.
illustration 5. Further, § 31 of the Tentative Draft of the Restatement, the predecessor to § 40, provided that one nation must consider "the rules and interests of the
other state having jurisdiction." Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 31 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). Similarly, one of the factors to be
considered was the "extent to which the vital national interests of the respective states
are affected." Id. § 31(a). This language, requiring an inquiry into the foreign rules
and interests and the extent to which they would be affected by an exercise of
jurisdiction, was dropped from the present version of § 40. Restatement (Second) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 40 (1965).
205. A vital national interest is defined as "an interest such as national security or
general welfare to which a state attaches overriding importance." Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 40 comment b (1965). The
three illustrations following the definition pit one nation's interest in defense against
another nation's interest in maintaining its monopoly position with respect to a
defense commodity. The interest of the State concerned with defense is treated as
vital, whereas the interest of the other State in maintaining its monopoly power is
not. Id. illustrations 3-5.
206. Id. § 40 comment b (emphasis added).
207. See United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330-33 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404,
407-09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903-05 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,
[Current Developments] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,346, at 92,148-49 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 16, 1981). But cf. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.,
563 F.2d 992, 997-99 (10th Cir. 1977) (contempt sanction vacated under balancing
approach, but the primary reason for vacating the sanction was the appellant's good
faith efforts at compliance); Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35,
41 (2d Cir. 1972) (production not ordered under the balancing approach when the
information was irrelevant to the case).
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situation presented by the uranium cartel litigation, the conflict might
well have been perceived as between the United States interests in
discovery and enforcement of its antitrust laws and the hardship to the
parties resisting discovery. Therefore, the significant infringement on
the Canadian economic policies that prompted the passage of the
nondisclosure law may have been glossed over. That the balancing
approach can lead to the failure to focus on the real conflict is well
08
illustrated by its application in United States v. Field."
In Field, the director of a Cayman Islands bank, while in the
United States, was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating the use of foreign banks to evade United States tax laws.20- '
The director refused to testify on the ground that testifying would
violate Cayman bank secrecy law,2 10 but the court ordered him to
testify nonetheless.2 1

The focus of the court's inquiry was on the

necessity of providing grand juries with information and the enforcement of United States tax laws. 21- The court's inquiry into the Cayman interests only went so far as to determine that Cayman officials
could have compelled the director to testify in a domestic investigation.2 13 The court used this determination to support its own assertion of jurisdiction on the ground that it made no difference that the
inquiring body was that of a foreign government.214 The court did
not examine the policies underlying the Cayman law. The court also
failed to consider any of the other factors outlined in the Restatement.
In particular, the court gave little weight to the harsh penalties to
which the director would be subject under Cayman law. : 13
The Restatement was designed to apply not only to nondisclosure
laws, but to all instances of conflicting concurrent jurisdiction.21 6 As
such, it does not address all the considerations peculiar to the nondisclosure law dilemma. Some courts have sought to remedy this failure
by including one or more of the following factors in their Restatement
'
analyses: the necessity of the documents,217
the availability of alterna-

208. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
209. Id. at 405.
210. Id. at 406; see Bank of Jamaica Law, 1961, ch. 6. § 34 (Cayman Islands
1963).
211. 532 F.2d at 410.
212. Id. at 407-09.
213. Id. at 408.
214. Id.
215. Bank of Jamaica Law, 1961, ch. 6, § 34 (Cayman Islands 1963) (200 fine or
six-months imprisonment with or without hard labor).
216. See Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 39-40 (1965).
217. United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 1977): cf. Trade Dev. Bank %-.
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tive means of compliance 2 8 and the existence of foreign protests. 2 1
The courts' varying inclusions of factors beyond those enumerated by
the Restatement suggest that even the Restatement fails to provide a
comprehensive approach to the resolution of the nondisclosure law
dilemma.
The rationale behind the defense of foreign governmental compulsion provides further support for the assertion that the foreign policies
should be fairly weighed. The defense is premised on the principle
that acts carried out in obedience to the mandate of a foreign government should be accorded special deference. 220 Developed in the antitrust field, the defense shields such acts from liability as if they were
the acts of the foreign government. 22 ' Although the defense should
not act as an absolute bar to ordering production or imposing sanctions, when noncompliance with a discovery request is compelled to
protect foreign sovereign interests, an inquiry should be made into
those interests by United States courts in determining whether to
compel production.
Two commentators, recognizing the failure of the existing approaches to resolve the nondisclosure law dilemma, 22 2 have suggested
alternatives. One advocates the increased use of international treaties
respecting the production of documents.22 3 The controversy surrounding the uranium cartel litigation, however, suggests that the
possibility of negotiating such treaties is remote. In addition, treaties
relating to discovery often provide that a foreign nation may withhold
documents that it considers vital to protect its sovereign interests . 224

Continental Ins. Co.. 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1971'. (requested information apparently not maintained in documentary form).
218. United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, [Current Developments] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,346, at 92,145
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981).
219. United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); United States v. First Nat'l City
Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir. 1968).
220. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d
Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597,
606-07 (9th Cir. 1976); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291, 1297 (D. Del. 1970).
221. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606
(9th Cir. 1976); McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Payments by Corporations:A ComparativeLegal Systems Analysis, 46 Fordham L. Rev.
1071, 1105 (1978).
222. Foreign Nondisclosure, supra note 8, at 617-19, 621; Recent Developments,
supra note 48, passim.
223. Recent Developments, supra note 48, at 770-74.
224. E.g., Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-West Germany, art. 3, 27 U.S.T. 1956,
1958, T.I.A.S. No. 8291; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25,
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Another commentator has suggested a four-step approach designed
to avoid conflicts: (1) require a prompt showing of a conflict with the
foreign law; (2) limit the request to documents that are directly
relevant to the litigation in order that the request is more in line with
the discovery practices abroad; (3) use letters rogatory to obtain the
documents; and (4) if the letters rogatory procedure fails, require the
party resisting discovery to attempt to obtain a waiver of the foreign
law.2 25 This commentator concluded that if conflict was unavoidable, a court ought to be reluctant to impose sanctions on the noncomplying party. 6
The use of the first three steps should be encouraged. The requirement that the party seek a waiver of the foreign law, however, is in
effect no different than ordering the party to produce the documents. 227 More importantly, the four-step approach fails to consider
the underlying competing interests, thereby demonstrating concern
for international comity on a procedural level only.
IV. PROPOSAL

The following suggested approach to the nondisclosure law dilemma is designed to minimize the potential for conflicts. To that end,
it advocates use of letters rogatory to obtain the evidence, exploration
of alternative methods of obtaining the same information, and thorough examination and weighing, at the order stage of the litigation, of
the policy interests underlying both the nondisclosure law and the
United States law sought to be enforced.
The first three steps of the four-step approach22 8 discussed above
should be employed. First, the court should determine that an actual
conflict with the nondisclosure law exists.2 29 The party resisting production should be required to allege the existence of the nondisclosure
law promptly and show that the documents withheld are subject to
the law.2 30 Such a requirement would eliminate the use of nondisclo-

1973, United States-Switzerland, art. 3, 27 U.S.T. 2019, 2028, T.I.A.S. No. 8302;
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, openedfor signatureMar. 18, 1970, art. 12, 23 U.S.T. 2555. 2562, T.I.A.S.
No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 241.
225. Foreign Nondisclosure, supra note 8, at 623-27.
226. Id. at 627.
227. When a party is ordered to produce documents located abroad, its first step is
usually to seek waivers of the foreign law. See, e.g., Societe Internationale v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1958); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts
Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 1977).
228. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
229. Foreign Nondisclosure, supra note 8, at 624.
230. Id.
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sure laws as a dilatory tactic.2 31 Second, the court should employ
letters rogatory to enlist the aid of the foreign government in securing

the documents.2 31 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has adopted an approach which similarly uses diplomatic chan233

nels in an attempt to address the concerns of foreign governments.

Such an approach is more likely to meet with success than ordering
23 4
production without enlisting the aid of the foreign government,

particularly when the foreign government is likely to consider the

issuance of a production order an infringement on its sovereignty.2 31
If the foreign nation declines to enforce the letters rogatory, the
court must then decide whether to compel production. Three basic
principles should guide the court's inquiry: (1) that nondisclosure laws
often are designed to protect legitimate foreign policies which are
deserving of judicial respect;2 36 (2) that it should not lightly compel
acts that violate the laws of another country; and (3) that its assertion

of enforcement jurisdiction must be based on reasonableness. With
these principles guiding the inquiry, the court should consider the
following five factors:
(1) Importance of the documents to the resolution of key issues in

the litigation. A party should not be required to produce unnecessary

documents. 237 This point was recognized in Trade Development
Bank v. Continental Insurance Co.,235 where the identity of bank
account holders was deemed irrelevant to an action on a fidelity bond
arising out of mismanagement of the customers' accounts. 23

(2) Alternative means of obtaining the information contained in
the documents. The court should explore whether a party not subject
231. Nondisclosure laws have been used to delay discovery in several cases. E.g..
United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied.
50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981); General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co.,
90 F.R.D. 290, 301-03 (S.D. Cal. 1981); Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 16-17
(D. Colo. 1977), afJ'd sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic
Co., 629 P.2d 231, 292-93 (N.M. 1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S.

901 (1981). In Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., the defendant used the Swiss nondisclosure law
to delay compliance with the production order affirmed in Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1096 (1977), and It
was not until one year later that it became apparent that the applicability of the
Swiss law was doubtful and its enforcement unlikely. 75 F.R.D. at 16-17,
232. Foreign Nondisclosure, supra note 8, at 625-26.

233. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Manual, at VII-17 to
-18 (1979).
234. 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17, § 15.12(c).
235. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
236. See 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17, § 15.17.
237. Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972):
Onkelinx, supra note 24, at 532-33; Foreign Nondisclosure, supra note 8, at 624-25.

238. 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972).
239. Id. at 37, 41.
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to the nondisclosure law has copies of the needed documents, or
whether the same information is obtainable from other sources, such
as oral testimony. 240 The exploration of alternative means of compliance before the entry of the production order would have been particularly helpful in the uranium cartel litigation. In the antitrust
action, 4 ' the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered the release of grand jury transcripts to offset the failure to
comply with the production order.2-42 Similarly, in the related contracts actions, 243 the Tenth Circuit refused to hold a party in contempt
for failure to comply with the order because some of the information
sought, though of potential significance, was duplicative.2 -44 Had
these alternatives been considered prior to the entry of the production
order, the conflict might have been lessened.
(3) Importance of the underlying interests. If the court finds that
the documents are necessary and that there are no alternative means
of obtaining the same information, it should evaluate the competing
interests to determine whether a production order should issue. The
court's inquiry should go beyond the threshold discovery conflict and
focus upon the policies underlying the United States law sought to be
enforced and those underlying policies intended to be furthered by the
nondisclosure law. The propriety of the production order should turn
on a weighing of the relative strengths and weaknesses of these interests within their respective domestic frameworks. In assessing the
importance of the foreign interests, the court should make the following inquiries.
First, the court should examine any available legislative history of
the foreign nondisclosure law and the historical setting in which it was
enacted. Second, the court should consider the likelihood of the law's
enforcement in the instant case, taking into account the circumstances
under which it has been enforced or waived in the past. Third, the
court should consider whether the law is enforced by the State, as in
Societe,2 45 or by private action, as in United States v. First National
City Bank.2 46 Fourth, the court should look at the severity of the
penalties imposed for the law's violation. For example, violation of

240. See United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981). cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1981): Onkelinx, supra note 24, at 532-33:
OrderingProduction, supra note 6, at 801-02.

241. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., [1981-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,917 (N.D.
Il1. Dec. 17, 1980).
242. id.
243. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992
(10th Cir. 1977).
244. Id. at 999.
245. 357 U.S. 197, 200-01 (1958) (interdiction placed on release of documents).
246. 396 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the Panamanian law at issue in In re Chase Manhattan Bank2 47 was
punishable only by a minimal fine.2 48 In contrast, violation of the
Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations2 4 was punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 and up to five years imprisonment.2 50 Finally, the court should note any protests that the foreign
government has made, either to the Department of State or directly to
the court.
In determining the importance of the foreign interests, the court
should require the person resisting production to provide the court
25
with information regarding the foreign interests and the statute. 1
The court should also urge foreign governments to make their positions known to the court by filing amicus
curiae briefs, a practice
252
encouraged by the Department of State.
(4) Identity of the party resistingproduction. If the party resisting
discovery is a defendant, the court should exercise greater restraint
when ordering production or imposing sanctions than when a plaintiff
resists production, because, as a plaintiff, that party has invoked the
process of the United States courts to adjudicate its claim. If the party
is an American, the court should consider how the documents came to
be abroad because the courts should not countenance acts 25intended
to
3
make documents unavailable in anticipation of litigation.
(5) Where the acts giving rise to the cause of action occurred. If the
acts occurred abroad, the court should moderate its actions in light of
what foreign governments may consider to be an illegal extraterritorial application of United States laws. 25 4 If the acts giving rise to the
cause of action occurred within the United States, however, the court
should be more willing to order production.
Finally, the court should exercise restraint when imposing rule
37(b) sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders. Except
when a party has acted willfully or has deliberately courted legal
impediments to the production of documents, the court may not,
consistent with due process, enter dismissals 255 or default judg247. 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
248. I Codigo de Comercio, tit. III, art. 89 (Pan. 1961) (100 balboas).
249. Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 76-644 (1976).
250. Atomic Energy Act, Can. Rev. Stat. ch. A-19, § 19 (1970).
251. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (court may take evidence from parties or conduct
own investigation when determining foreign law).
252. Letter from Associate Attorney General John H. Shenefield to District Judge
Prentiss Marshall (May 6, 1980), reprinted in 1980 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,416.
253. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
254. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., 111 D.L.R.3d 74, 86-87, 91-92
(Can. 1980); Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 78 D.L.R.3d 3,
21-22 (Ont. 1977); Int'l Law Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-First Conference 565-92
(Tokyo 1964) (collection of diplomatic protests).
255. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-13 (1958); cf. In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th Cir.
1977) (vacating contempt sanction for failure to comply with production order).
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ments. 256 Similarly, the court should avoid designating facts as established or precluding the assertion of defenses or claims when such
action would be tantamount to decreeing a default or a dismissal.Y7
Using rebuttable presumptions, shifting the burden of proof or employing greater
or lesser standards of proof should be the favored
28
sanctions. 5
The advantages of this five-step approach are several. First, the
emphasis on the use of letters rogatory and exploration of alternative
means of compliance may help to avoid conflicts. Second, this approach removes the problem from the discovery-oriented lex foril
international comity analysis, and recognizes that the real conflict is
between the underlying interests of the two nations. Third, the approach identifies all of the relevant factors leading to a better understanding of the problem. Emphasizing restraint, reasonableness and
respect for foreign interests may also aid in its resolution.
Moreover, examining the relevant issues at the order phase, rather
than at the sanction phase, will help to minimize conflicts. In some
instances, it will become apparent that the foreign interests prevail
and that production should not be ordered. Consideration of the
foreign interests at the order phase may also lead to quicker production.259 Such action also demonstrates greater respect for the laws of
the foreign sovereign, because the order is entered only after an
attempt has been made to accommodate its interests. Foreign nations,
however, may view United States courts as not being in a position to
evaluate their interests and may consider any evaluation of their
interests as infringing on their sovereignty, preferring to settle discovery disputes through diplomatic channels.2 60 That temporary fluctuations in the political climate could affect the due process rights of
claimants2 6' compelled Congress to remove determinations of foreign

256. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-13 (1958).
257. 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 17, § 15.21.

258. Id.
259. In SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, [Current Developments] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,346 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1981), the court indicated that it would
enter an order and impose sanctions for noncompliance, which prompted the Swiss
government to grant the defendant a waiver. Id. at 92,145, 92,14849.
260. B. Hawk, Report on Seven Springs Symposium, United States Antitrust Laws
and Multinational Business (manuscript to be published in 1982) (symposium held
Dec. 1981).
261. See Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the Protection of the
Individualin InternationalEconomic Regulation, 17 Ad. L. Rev. 159, 170-71 (1964);
Note, The Sovereign's Immunity and Private Property: A Due Proces Problem, 50
Geo. L.J. 284, 303 (1961); cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 141, 152, 1 Wheat.
304, 329 (1816) (courts' declining to exercise judicial power might defeat the Constitution).
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sovereign immunity from the Department of State to the judiciary.2 02
Similarly, the judiciary should not leave resolution of international
discovery conflicts to the political expediencies that may attend the
use of diplomatic channels.
CONCLUSION

In cases like those comprising the uranium cartel litigation, the
solution will be neither simple nor ideal. The accommodation of
conflicting policies that are on the same plane of national importance
is difficult, but that is no reason to ignore the conflict and look only to
United States interests. The courts must be willing to exercise greater
restraint than they have in the past, even if it means compromising
American policies. Ultimately, both the United States and foreign
nations need to compromise their enforcement actions. The first
move, however, appears to be with the United States; nondisclosure
laws are directed against extraterritorial application of United States
laws and ensuing discovery requests that many nations, including
some of our closest allies, consider infringements on their sovereignty.
In the end, the ability of the United States courts to obtain documents
located abroad in order to enforce its laws with respect to extraterritorial conduct will depend upon the ability of the United States to
accommodate and respect the policies of other nations.
Thomas Scott Miurley

262. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6606; Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of
ForeignSovereign Immunity, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 155, 197-98 (1981). The provision
is located at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976), which was enacted as part of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 90-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).

